Tenets To Live By (For Recovering Overachievers): Prohairesis

I suppose there are two kinds of over-achievers.
(a) Those who over-achieve naturally, regardless of the input of others. They just follow their instincts and their heart and the result is: exceptional achievement.

And then there are ....

(b) Those who grind themselves to the ground in their efforts to please their relatives and peers. Their lack of self-acceptance completely overshadows any other thoughts, feelings or emotions. They pursue self-acceptance through the eyes of others. And it is a horrid journey.

I've taken this journey because I belong to 'b' family. (Maybe I should have reversed the list above so I could belong to 'a' family instead. 'a' sounds superior to 'b'.)

Pleasing others is exhausting. Members of 'b' family burn out, loathe themselves in varying degrees, get sick and unhealthy from overwork and exhaustion, and look a bit foolish doing all this. They look most foolish to themselves because they wonder ... what (the heck) are they doing and who are they doing it for?

I asked myself those last two questions daily and never got an answer better than, "Well, I don't know what I'm doing and I'm sure as heck not doing it for me."

I have, in my pursuit of philosophy, stumbled across a few wonderful ideas that I wish to incorporate into my daily life. And I will present them one by one.

Prohairesis 

(Stoicism, Aristotle, Epictetus)

In a very simple sense, Prohairesis is the result of a happy collaboration between our rational thought (logos) and our irrational desires (orexis). "The concord of reason and desire." (1) Charles Chamberlain writes beautifully on this.

Aristotle says this: In our daily lives, once we have rationally decided to pursue a course of action, we must align our desire with that action. "We must make our desire accord with reason."

"Children and animals have no share in prohairesis." (1)

Aristotle goes on to say that:

"The weak willed man (akrates) acts in accordance with desire, not with commitment (prohairoumenos), while the continent man (engkrates) on the other hand acts in accordance with commitment not with desire."

Where I disagree:
Chamberlain goes on to say that, "The engkrates, who has also undertaken a commitment, feels the pull of desire, but perseveres. By doing so, he allows new desire to form."

I can guarantee that the writer of this post (that's me) is a quintessential engkrates that did not develop a new desire. I undertook a commitment (engineering), I felt the pull of desire (other meaningful and honourable pursuits), I persevered (4 years of engineering and 13 years of professional practice), and it ended in despair. No seeds of desire sprung into saplings of corporate greed, or deceitful tactics. Neither did the love of endless toil that bore sub-par fruit blossom in my tender heart.

However, I think Prohairesis has hopes for the likes of us (i.e. overachieving people pleasers) in Epictetus' Discourses below (2):

"No one is master of another's prohairesis [moral character], and in this alone lies good and evil. No one, therefore, can secure the good for me, or involve me in evil, but I alone have authority over myself in these matters." (Discourses 4.12.7–8, trans. Dobbin)

I cannot control the rational thought or the desires of another. (Read as: my verbally abuse co-worker has his/her own set of rational thoughts and desires. Neither am I privy to them, nor do I have any control of them. How insultingly simple.)
And in this alone lies good and evil. My participation is secured - by the greatest actor of this play: ME.

"Some things are up to us [eph' hêmin] and some things are not up to us. Our opinions are up to us, and our impulses, desires, aversions–in short, whatever is our own doing. Our bodies are not up to us, nor are our possessions, our reputations, or our public offices, or, that is, whatever is not our own doing." (Handbook 1.1, trans. White)

If we took control of, took responsibility for, those things that are within our power, that are up to us, we would be happy. Would we not?

We try so hard to control the happiness of others by working 80 hours a week, abandoning our families, neglecting our bodies, but can we control the happiness of our bosses? No. They remain unhappy. The jokes I kept hearing during crunch time, "He's a crabby old man because his wife doesn't put out." have a terrible ring of truth to them. We don't know why he's crabby.... we don't know what motivates the other, yet we try so hard to control their responses. 

We ignore the things we can control. Our own mood, desires, location, health, happiness. We sacrifice these things, why? Has it been taught to us from a young age? Or can we be brave enough to admit that it is in our nature to do this?

Every time I feel seething rage at someone else for their behaviour, I must remember that what I can control is my anger and not their behaviour. When I feel crushed and broken after receiving a poor review of my work, all I have to do is identify that my feelings of dismay are within my control and the review presented to me is not.

That which we have power over, we must take responsibility for. Then we must proceed to control it, for therein lies our happiness. The moods, whims, fantasies, wishes, desires, anger, disappointment of the other is not within our power. To try and control it is madness.

It is therefore a sin to give our efforts away to fruitless endeavour. It is an affront to us, and to nature, to try and defy what is laid out in front of us.

Be the master of your mood, and therefore your fate. Let the other master his/her own destiny.

And in this way, let us be selfish. Would the world not be a better place?

References:

(1) The Meaning of Prohairesis in Aristotle's Ethics

Charles Chamberlain

Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-)

Vol. 114 (1984), pp. 147-157
(2)  http://www.iep.utm.edu/epictetu/

"To maintain our prohairesis (moral character) in the proper condition – the successful accomplishment of this being necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia ('happiness') – we must understand what is eph' hêmin ('in our power' or 'up to us'; see Discourses 1.22.9–16). If we do not do this, our prohairesis will remain in a faulty condition, for we will remain convinced that things such as wealth and status are good when they are really indifferent, troubled by frustrations and anxieties, subject to disturbing emotions we do not want and cannot control, all of which make life unpleasant and unrewarding, sometimes overwhelmingly so. This is why Epictetus remarks: 'This is the proper goal, to practise how to remove from one's life sorrows and laments, and cries of "Alas" and "Poor me", and misfortune and disappointment' (Discourses 1.4.23, trans. Dobbin).

No one is master of another's prohairesis [moral character], and in this alone lies good and evil. No one, therefore, can secure the good for me, or involve me in evil, but I alone have authority over myself in these matters. (Discourses 4.12.7–8, trans. Dobbin)

What is in our power, then, is the 'authority over ourselves' that we have regarding our capacity to judge what is good and what is evil. Outside our power are 'external things', which are 'indifferent' with respect to being good or evil. These indifferents, as we saw in the previous section, number those things that are conventionally deemed to be good and those that are conventionally deemed to be bad. Roughly, they are things that 'just happen', and they are not in our power in the sense that we do not have absolute control to make them occur just as we wish, or to make them have exactly the outcomes that we desire. Thus, for example, sickness is not in our power because it is not wholly up to us whether we get sick, and how often, nor whether we will recover quickly or indeed at all. Now, it makes sense to visit a doctor when we feel ill, but the competence of the doctor is not in our power, and neither is the effectiveness of any treatment that we might be offered. So generally, it makes sense to manage our affairs carefully and responsibly, but the ultimate outcome of any affair is, actually, not in our power.
What is in our power is the capacity to adapt ourselves to all that comes about, to judge anything that is 'dispreferred' not as bad, but as indifferent and not strong enough to overwhelm our strength of character.
The Handbook of Epictetus begins with these words:

Some things are up to us [eph' hêmin] and some things are not up to us. Our opinions are up to us, and our impulses, desires, aversions–in short, whatever is our own doing. Our bodies are not up to us, nor are our possessions, our reputations, or our public offices, or, that is, whatever is not our own doing. (Handbook 1.1, trans. White)

That is, we have power over our own minds. The opinions we hold of things, the intentions we form, what we value and what we are averse to are all wholly up to us. Although we may take precautions, whether our possessions are carried off by a thief is not up us (but the intention to steal, that of course is in the power of the thief), and our reputations, in whatever quarter, must be decided by what other people think of us, and what they do think is up to them. Remaining calm in the face of adversity and controlling our emotions no matter what the provocation (qualities of character that to this day are referred to as 'being stoical'), are accomplished in the full Stoic sense, for Epictetus, by making proper use of impressions."

(3) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohairesis